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Abstract 
Social ties are potentially an important determinant of migrants’ intention to return to their 
home country, and yet this topic has not been addressed in the existing economics literature 
on international migration. This study examines the absolute and relative importance of 
migrant social networks both at destination and at origin. We base our research on 
experimental data from Batista and Narciso (2013)1. By defining networks according to 
different characteristics of their members and migrant return intentions with respect to three 
different time horizons, we are able to dissect the network effect into its components. After 
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and reverse causality biases we find that network 
at home seems to be the most important determinant of the migrant’s intention to return home 
within five and ten years. 
Keywords: International migration, Return migration, Return intentions, Social networks. 
1. Introduction 
According to the most recent OECD International Migration Outlook (2015), the level 
of legal permanent immigration to OECD countries summed 4.3 million of individuals in 
2014. Among these, 1 million per year entered the EU, matching in this way the inflow to 
the USA. At the same time, the yearly figures for foreign-born leaving an OECD country are 
substantial and can range from 20% to 75% of the immigrant stock (OECD, 2008). 
Furthermore, between 20% and 50% of the inflow willreturn to the country of origin after 
five years from the arrival (Dustmann, Görlach; 2015). In the case of Ireland, among those 
                                                          
1
 The data consists in a representative sample of 1500 immigrants living in the Great Dublin Area, Dublin, 
Ireland 
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immigrated between 1993 and 1998, 60.4% returned to their home country after five years 
(OECD, 2008). 
The relevance of international migration is not just a recent phenomenon. In fact, it 
has been an object of study under many lenses. A great deal of the recent economics research 
on international migration has focused on explaining the determinants of actual migration 
patterns. (See Borjas, Bratsberg (1996), Bertoli et al. (2013) and McKenzie et al. (2014)). 
Yet, very few studies undertook the study of migrato y intentions (as opposed to actual 
migratory movements) and the formation process of such migration intention decisions. 
Studying the migrant intention to move across countries, rather than the actual 
movement, provides a net advantage. If on one hand, migrant intentions are more exposed to 
changes over time that can be difficult to predict, given the very nature of individual 
intentions. On the other hand, migrant intentions return a cleaner measure for migration 
decisions (Dustmann, 2000). Indeed, investment, consumption and labor supply decisions 
are often conditioned by current intentions rather an by “final realizations” as presented in 
Dustmann (2000). Moreover, by focusing on migration intentions, we are able to study return 
migration patterns, which usually implies following the migrants over time for several years. 
This is an expensive process and often discarded by researchers, which mainly focused their 
attention on immigration dynamics.2 A way to elude this unbalance and to shed some mor 
light on the partially unexplored area of return migration comes from focusing on migrants 
                                                          
2 A few exceptions are Borjas and Bratsberg (1992), Mesnard (2004), Yang (2006), Batista, McIndoe-Calder 
and Vicente (2014), Dustmann (1997), and Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2002). 
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intentions. In this paper, we aim at bringing together these two neglected aspects of the 
migration experience. 
As reported by Dolfin and Genicot (2006), the existing literature widely recognizes 
the pivotal role of social networks in affecting migratory decisions. In particular, networks 
facilitate the migration process and enhance it by attracting new immigrants to the host 
country (Dolfin, Genicot; 2006). Networks affect migration decisions through three channels. 
They allow information, support in the job market and safety both at destination and at origin 
(Dolfin, Genicot; 2006). Yet, there is no clear understanding on these underlying mechanisms 
through which social ties work. Our research question arises naturally form this framework. 
We want to know: What is the absolute and relative importance of networks at destination 
and at origin on return migration decisions? In particular, we want to understand whether 
there is a clear distinction between the effect due to the network at destination and the one 
attributable to the network at home. Our claim is that the two networks can be depicted as 
two “pull” factors. We would hence expect the return intention being indirectly proportional 
to the network size.  
In order to analyze the two network effects on the migrant intention to return, we 
define the intention to return with three different time horizons. This allows us to detect 
whether the network effect holds in the short, medium and long run. We also study the impact 
of networks in details, looking closely at the network characteristics in order to better identify 
the nature of the network effect. We find that the network at origin help explaining the 
migrant intention to return within five and ten years, while network at destination does not 
have any influence. A bigger network at home decreases the likelihood of the migrant to 
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return home. In particular, an increase of one member in the network size at the migrant’s 
country of origin will decrease the likelihood of the migrant to repatriate within the next ten 
years of almost 20 pp. Our results show that the widespread idea of networks easing 
migration (see Dolfin, Genicot; 2006) does not hold when we look at return migration. Our 
study contributes to the existing literature by providing empirical evidence on the formation 
process of migrant intentions to return. We believe it is a crucial contribution since it adds 
valuable knowledge on one of the main controversial and pivotal determinants of migration, 
the social networks. 
The remaining part of the article is structured as follows: the next section presents a 
brief literature review of the existing work on return migration and social networks. The third 
section is dedicated to the methodology and the fourth section to the descriptive statistics. In 
the fifth section, we present and discuss the results. In the last section, we draw the 
conclusions from our study. 
2. Literature review 
Migration decisions are as complex as the variety of factors they are based on is. 
Migrating is a decision that is taken at the indiviual level and it takes into consideration 
many different elements from the surrounding, as initially proposed by Sjaastad (1962) and 
Harris and Todaro (1970). 
Towards the end of the 80s, researchers started focusing on immigration and its non-
random selection processes, both in terms of observable characteristics – such as in Borjas 
(1987), Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) or Chiquiar andHanson(2005) – and of unobservable 
characteristics – such as in Batista (2008) or Bertoli e  al. (2013). More recently, the literature 
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on the determinants of migration has broadened to examine both the origin and destination 
countries, adopting increasingly more field and natural experiments as sources of exogenous 
variation – as is exemplary in Yang (2006) and McKenzi  et al. (2014). 
Yang (2006) examines how households use migration as a technology for saving 
purposes, and the way this conditions return migration decisions. By examining the impact 
of an exogenous exchange rate shock on actual return migration, Yang aims at clarifying the 
determinants of return migration between target earn rs and life-cycle migrants. He finds that 
migration allows household-investments back home. Complementary to Yang (2006) 
contribution, Gibson and McKenzie (2011) find that among highly skilled individuals the 
life-cycle reasons predominate. According to these results, return migration seems to be 
determined more by preferences and local amenities than purely by individual gains in 
income (Dustmann, 2000). In addition, Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2002) show that wages in 
the host country are indirectly proportional to theoptimal migration duration. There is in fact 
a decreasing marginal benefit of migration. Moreover, they find that the higher the schooling 
level, the shorter the optimal migration period will be. 
Another focal point in the literature has been the rol of human capital in the context 
of international migration. Return migration can be a way to capitalize in the country of origin 
the skills that have been accumulated during the migration experience. Batista, Lacuesta, and 
Vicente (2012) provide strong evidences in support of the hypothesis of human capital gains 
deriving from migration. Their result are consistent with the model developed by Dustmann, 
Fadlon and Weiss (2010), which is a theoretical model where return migration that responds 
to human capital accumulation. They show that when the human capital endowment of 
individuals can be improved more efficiently abroad, their return to the home country will be 
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delayed. McKenzie and Rapoport (2007) provide further evidence on the human capital gain 
coming from migration.  
When we consider migrant unobservable characteristics, selection into migration is 
not easy to detect and isolate. McKenzie and Rapoport (2010) study self-selection patterns 
among Mexican migrants to USA. They find that – depending on whether the migrant lives 
in a highly or lowly networked community – the probability of migration is directly 
proportional to the education level in low networks communities and indirectly proportional 
to education of the migrant in communities that are highly networked. Therefore, a larger 
network means more incentives to migrate at any educational level. At the same time, by 
dealing with networks, one has to bear in mind thatere is a double selection problem; one 
is into migration the other into the network. Other studies on individual unobservable 
characteristics – e.g. the entrepreneurial spirit of the migrant – and the key role they play in 
return migration  are Dostie and Léger (2009) and Batista, McIndoe-Calder and Vicente 
(2014). 
Social networks play a crucial role in affecting migration decisions. A key feature of 
their formation process is the non-randomness. On the contrary, its development is driven 
mainly by factors related to ethnicity and geography (Marmaros, Sacerdote 2006; Jackson, 
Rogers 2007). Notwithstanding, these, together with homophily, can also lead to less 
integration and cause segregation (Currarini, Jackson, Pin 2009). Furthermore, depending on 
the level of integration in the job market and on the very nature of the networks themselves, 
the migration experience can be more or less successful. Consequently, depending on how 
successful the integration process was, a migrant could consider re-migrating or returning 
home (Borjas, Bratsberg 1996). 
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The most comprehensive definition for the several functions served by social 
networks is the one of mitigating migration costs (Sjaastad, 1962). Yet, there are three 
potential channels, through which social networks can affect migration decisions. 
First, networks catalyze information (Bloch et al. 2008). In addition, by defining the 
borders of social ties, homophily influences how information is spread within and across the 
networks (Currarini, Jackson, Pin 2009). Networks can be particularly effective as a source 
of information on the labor market3, providing more and better jobs opportunities and 
therewith influencing the success of the migration experience (Umblijs, 2012). Further 
evidences demonstrated how more networks lead to more job opportunities (Munshi 2003). 
Second, social networks influence migration decision by determining the migrant 
integration in the host country. homophily assumes a crucial role with respect to network 
effect estimation, as it represents a source of correlated unobservables jointly with social 
norms (Manski, 1993; Cai, de Janvry, A. and E. Sadoulet, 2015). Goel and Lang (2009), 
prove how already present immigrants in locus facilit te the assimilation of new-coming 
migrants. At the same time, though, networks can also lead to segregation for particular 
ethnic enclaves and therefore lead to worse jobs and exclusion (Borjas, 2000). 
Third, networks can be an insurance mechanism that helps reducing the risk 
associated with migrating (Umblijs, 2012). Furthermo e, social ties can work as a very 
peculiar risk management platform based on mutual and self-enforcing informal insurance 
agreements (Bloch et al., 2008). At the same time, networks at home represent a way to insure 
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 For a more extended literature revision see Dolfin, Genicot (2006) 
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too (Batista and Umblijs, 2016). In addition, Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) show that 
networks facilitate insurance against risk, yet individuals do not choose the composition of 
their networks in order to maximize the income gain coming from risk sharing 
3. Methodology 
The central hypothesis examined in this paper proposes that migrant’s social networks at 
the destination and at the origin influence the migrant’s decision to return to the origin 
country. More specifically, considered the functions through which networks operate, we 
expect to see earlier return intentions at a stage where the network at home is small, since 
with a bigger network at home, the migrant can still benefit from it relying on different 
contacts in case of need. The same dynamic should hold at destination, where a bigger 
network implies stronger ties from which the migrant can still benefit. 
In order to empirically evaluate this hypothesis, we proceed by building an econometric 
model that allows us to estimate the nature and the irection of the existing relationships4: 
 =  + 	
 + 	 +  +  
where  represents a binary variable summarizing the migrant’s intention to return with 
respect to three different time horizons ;  is the constant term for the specification. 	
 
and 	  are the dependent variables representing networks at destination and at home, 
                                                          
4
 We also estimate separate models that only consider e ther the network at destination or the one at origin. By 
considering one network at the time, these models allow to detect the absolute importance of both networks, 
although they are not exempt from omitted variable bias. Therefore, the core model of our analysis considers 
both networks at once. 
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respectively;5  stands for the vector of controls, while  represents the stochastic error 
term of the model. 
The model discerns the effects of one network relatively to the other by estimating 
the existing relationship between the outcome under analysis and both types of network 
simultaneously. 
In our econometric analysis, we include a vector of c ntrol variables including 
observable and unobservable characteristics that might affect the formation of intentions to 
return6. As we further describe in the section dedicated to the descriptive statistics, we take 
into consideration various definitions for both thedependent and the independent variables.  
Since migration intentions can vary with respect to different time frameworks, we are 
able to better identify the nature of the relationship in analysis by putting it into a time 
perspective. Thus, we define return intentions according to three different horizons. The first 
refers to whether the migrant ever intends to return. The second considers the intention of 
returning within the next five-year period, while the third extends the period to up to ten 
years, and it is regarded for the purpose of our study as a comprehensive proxy for medium 
run return decision dynamics. Similarly, it is possible to define networks in several ways7. 
We define the network as network size. By doing this we can detect the effect of having a 
                                                          
5 Index  represents different definition for the network based on its characteristics 
6
 We control for individual characteristics (gender, age, spousal status, religion) and household and network 
characteristics (number of children, household income, a dummy variable for having sent remittances abroad 
during last year). We also control for variables that we consider proxies for unobservables as entrepren urship, 
ability and risk-aversion (e.g. years spent in Ireland, intention to stay at arrival, years of schooling and a risk-
aversion proxy represented by a lottery-game [see Supplementary Appendix]). 
7
 For each migrant, we the network at destination includes household members, friends and acquaintances, and 
contacts already present in Ireland before arrival. The network at home gathers family members and friends. 
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bigger or smaller network in terms of migrant intentio s to return. Therefore, network size 
can be regarded as a proxy for network effect intensi y. Yet, networks are much more 
complicated structures than simple clusters of contacts. Ergo, for a deeper understanding of 
the mechanic underlying the network effect, we disassemble the network size in some of its 
main characteristics that we consider key. The compositional analysis we set up takes into 
account two main aspects that can influence the nature of the existing relationship between 
the migrant and her network. 
A first crucial aspect of this relationship is the effort that the migrant puts in keeping 
contact with her network members. It is therefore int resting to look at those members that 
are not part of the family8 and hence those that the migrant can include or exclude from her 
network more freely. Keeping in touch with these network members represents an interested 
choice with respect to the functions that the network exerts, as we discussed in the previous 
chapter. 
A second element that has to be borne in mind when dealing with social ties is how 
effective the network is in accomplishing one of its main functions, providing job solutions. 
As we stressed already, jobs represent a pivotal factor in most migrants’ decision to stay or 
leave. Therefore, the choice of restricting the network to just working members follows 
naturally. 
As we mentioned in the previous sections, we provide estimates for three different 
outcomes and several definitions of networks. We first analyze the relationship between 
                                                          
8
 We define family in two manners: first, we consider strict family members (parents, spouse, children and 
siblings). Second, we extend the definition to other relatives. 
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return intentions and migrant networks within a Linear Probability Model (LPM) based 
framework.9 We are interested in knowing the magnitude of the co fficients related to the 
network effects at ceteris paribus condition. The main challenge faced by our econometric 
strategy comes from endogeneity. As is clear from the li erature, dealing with networks often 
means dealing with endogeneity (Manski, 1993; Carrell, Sacerdote, West, 2013; Baccara, 
Yariv, 2013). We identify two different sources of endogeneity. 
The first source of endogeneity we consider stems from the reverse causality problem, 
which affects both networks at destination and at home. The simple fact that migrants keep 
contacts with people in their country of origin may be the result of a wish to go back. The 
size of the network can depend on the intention of the migrant to return earlier or later in time 
to its country of origin. The same holds for networks at destination, whereby migrants can 
choose to include or exclude certain people depending on their wish to be more integrated or 
to return sooner. This considered, we face the problem that our outcome could influence back 
the explanatory variables. Consequently, as the LPM approach is not sound against these 
simultaneity problems, in order to be able to identify the correct network effects, we will 
follow a two-stage least squares approach. 
A second possible source of endogeneity comes from unobserved heterogeneity. To 
this extent, individual preferences and characteristics play a central role. For instance, a 
person with strong preferences for local amenities and consumption at the country of origin 
against the same goods at the country of destination could decide to build a bigger or smaller 
                                                          
9 Probit estimations return similar results in terms of ign, magnitudes and significance levels. For details, see 
Supplementary Appendix. 
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network at destination in order to hasten or delay the return. Similarly, risk-preferences are 
important factors of unobserved heterogeneity. More risk-averse individuals will probably 
rely on stronger social ties and their risk aversion is likely to affect the return intention. 
Moreover, because some people can have developed mor  social abilities than others do, they 
may have bigger networks and their individual characteristics might influence the intention 
to return as well. Also, as reported in several studies on homophily and discrimination, more 
educated people may have bigger or more educated networks. This is a further channel 
whereby networks can influence return purposes and vice versa. As we shortly anticipated, 
the way we choose to deal with both endogeneity sources, is the Instrumental Variable 
approach, since it allows us to cope with both problems of reverse causality and unobserved 
heterogeneity. 
In order to be valid, the instrument has to be highly correlated with the instrumented 
variable while it has to be exogenous with respect to the dependent variable. In other words, 
it has to be uncorrelated with the error term. For the network at destination, following 
Woodruff, Zenteno (2007) and McKenzie, Rapoport (2007), we use the stock of immigrants 
living in the country ten years before. In our case, it corresponds to the stock of migrants 
present in Ireland in 2000. To build the instrument we use census data from the database on 
Trends in International Migrant Stock: Migrants by Destination and Origin10. Some authors 
use interaction of past stock of migrants with variables that induce variation at the individual 
level. For example, McKenzie, Rapoport (2007) use past community networks time the years 
                                                          
10 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2013), 
POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2013. 
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of education. Another instrument for networks at destination present in the literature is 
rainfall, which finds a valid rational especially for those countries exposed to strong weather 
shocks, as in Munshi (2003) or Yang (2006). 
On the other hand, there is no clear indication from the literature on what is the most 
pertinent instrumental variable for the network at home. We decide to instrument the size of 
the network at home with the average self-reported cost of calling a network member back 
to their home country. This instrument entails indivi ual variation since it gathers the average 
self-reported costs that each migrant has to sustain by calling the different network members. 
As a valid instrument, it is correlated with the network size, since it entails the number of 
contacts the migrant has. At the same time, it is uncorrelated with the intention to return since 
it is very unlikely that a detail as the cost of a call will affect such important decision. At our 
best of knowledge, this is an innovative instrument for social networks. 
4. Descriptive statistics and data 
Our study uses the dataset from Batista and Narciso (2013). The sample gathers 
information at the individual level on about 1,500 household-representative adult 
immigrants, which live in the Greater Dublin Area. For the purpose of our research, we are 
going to consider the baseline sample, which counts 1,491 observations that were collected 
between February 2010 and December 2011. 
Migrants from 110 different nationalities are part of his cross-sectional sample. There 
are six main nationality groups represented: Nigerian 19%, Polish 10%, Indian 6% and South 
African 5%. On average, the migrants, object of our st dy, are 32 years old women, which 
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are not married. The proportion of males within thesample is 45 out of 100, on average. 
Regarding the household composition, 53% of the respondents do not have children. Among 
those individuals that do have children, the most cmmon case is of only child. A condition 
that is mirrored by 18% of the sample. 
The migrants in the sample are mainly highly educated individuals, 70% of which 
pursued a post-secondary or even a university degree. Only 5% of the sample stopped at 
lower secondary degree or before. Almost half of the sample, 48%, is taking part to a training 
that is not an English course and 18% is still studying. For the employed individuals, the 
average monthly individual income is about € 1,200 and the weekly average working-hours 
amount to 23. Among the interviewed migrants, 37% work in the tertiary sector, while 10% 
work in the commercial area and another 10% is unemployed. 
Only migrants whose year of arrival fell within the time range that covers the period 
between 2000 and six months before the beginning of the interviewing process in 2011 were 
considered eligible to be included in the sample. On average, the participants in the study 
came to Ireland at the age of 27 and at the time of the interview, they had spent five years in 
Ireland. Moreover, 80% had ever intended to return to their home country, while almost 40% 
intended to return within five years. 
The dataset does not only collect information on migrants and their households but 
also on their networks’ members. We consider as being part of the network at destination, 
members of the same household of the migrant, people the migrant is in contact with and the 
contacts the migrant had before migrating to Ireland. I  like fashion, the migrant’s family 
members and other people she is in contact with form the network at home. In order to keep 
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temporal consistency between the dependent and the explanatory variables of our models, 
we consider current network measures. An interesting piece of information reflects the 
importance of networks for these migrants. Around 82% of respondents do not have siblings 
living in Ireland, while 70% have between one and four siblings living in the migrant country 
of origin. 
5. Results 
In this section, we present the results of the econometric analysis. We first consider 
the LPM specification from the model based on both network sizes. Following, the results 
from the IV approach are shown. Finally, we report the results from the compositional 
analysis. 
At the LPM stage, both networks determines the general intention to return to the 
home country, with a coefficient of -0.0132 and -0.0274, respectively. Both networks yield 
negative signs, therefore our claim of the networks acting as two “pull” factors seems to find 
support. Moreover, the home network has a stronger magnitude. Restricting the time 
framework to five or ten years, we do not find significant results (See Table 2.a in Appendix). 
These estimates where obtained by estimating a liner probability model. For the 
previously highlighted potential endogeneity reasons, we cannot fully rely on these results 
and should therefore follow an estimation strategy based on a two-stages least squares 
approach. After having instrumented the network at destination for the past stock of migrants 
and the network at home for the average cost calling, we obtain the following results.  
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After having instrumented it, the size of network at destination does not contribute 
explaining the intention to return of the migrant ay longer. This is equally valid for each of 
the three time-frameworks. Only the network at home explains the intention to return of the 
migrant. Looking at the broader definition of return intention, we do not find significances. 
Now, we find strong and consistent evidences when w restrict the intention to return within 
the next five and ten years. We can say with a confide ce interval of 90% that an increase of 
one member in the size of the network at home decreases the probability of the migrant to 
return home within the next five years of 9%. If weconsider the migrant intention to return 
within the next ten years, the coefficient more than doubles. An increase of one member in 
the home network size decreases the probability of returning to the country of origin of 
19.4%, significant at the 1% level. The corresponding joint F – Statistic on the instruments 
is greater than the threshold value of ten confirming so the validity of our instrument (See 
Table 2.a in Appendix). 
As demonstrated by Umblijs (2012), migrants with more intense networks are more 
risk-averse, on average. Networks lower the level of uncertainty around migration decisions; 
therefore, the network effect could be partly due to the different risk-preferences of the 
migrant. In order to improve our understanding of the detected network effect, we proceed 
then by allowing the network size to interact with an indicator of migrant risk-aversion11.  
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 This indicator is based on a question from the survey, asking the respondent how much would she have 
contributed in a hypothetical lottery game (see Supplementary Appendix). The indicator consists in a dummy 
variable that takes value 0 when the respondent choses to not take part to the game and therefore contributing 
zero to the lottery and takes value 1 when the respondent contributed with a positive value. 
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Interestingly, results show that the none of the networks explains the general intention 
to return of the migrant at the IV stage12. The estimates deriving from the interaction with 
the risk indicator show no significances meaning that e network effect previously detected 
does not depend on risk-preferences of the migrant. 
5.1 Compositional analysis 
The nature of the network effects that have been detected so far can be due in part to 
the choice of using the general network size as dependent variable. Therefore, we need to 
proceed with a compositional analysis of the migrant networks in order to better identify their 
role in explaining the intentions to return. 
We consider three main categories for a narrower definition of network: highly educated 
network members, working network members, and non-family member individuals13. 
We first look at the number of highly educated peopl  defined as number of network 
members that pursued at least a primary university degree. For the LPM specifications, even 
after having considered the vector of controls and the fixed effects, the coefficients for the 
network sizes do not present significant results overall. Also at the IV stage highly educated 
home network size does not return significant estimates (see Table 3.a). Even though at the 
LPM stage we find a significant estimate for the int raction term of highly educated network 
at home with the risk indicator explaining the intention to return, there are no significances 
                                                          
12 See Table 2.b in Supplementary Appendix 
13
 We further define network size as non-strict family members (parents, spouse, siblings and children), no  
extended-family members (strict-family plus other rlatives). Also, we consider working members and 
working members that are not living in the same household of the migrant. For further details, see tables in 
the Supplementary Appendix. 
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at the IV stage (see Table 3.b). The same conclusion holds for network defined as number of 
working members, despite the significances at the LPM stage (see Tables 4.a,b). Now, when 
we consider working members that live outside the migrant household, we find significant 
estimates at the 10% level for the working network size at origin in explaining the intention 
to return within the next ten years. Yet, the corresponding joint F – Statistic is not 
satisfactorily higher than ten. After interacting the coefficients with the risk-aversion proxy, 
we do not find significant results (see Tables 5.a,b)  
We could further dissect the network members in two groups, those that are part of 
the same family of the migrant and those that are not. The latter group represents the contacts 
the migrant has to put more effort in keeping contact with. In tables 7.a and 7.b, we consider 
being part of the family all those members that are considered relatives by the respondent14. 
In Tables 6a,b we consider network as the number of non-family members living outside the 
migrant household. Although there are no significant findings for the general intention to 
return, significant evidences for the intention to return within five and ten years are found to 
be in line with the estimates of the general definitio  of both networks’ sizes. Network at the 
origin returns negative estimates. Yet, the instruments do not pass the weakness test jointly. 
After considering the interaction term, no significan es are found. Estimates from Tables 7a 
and 7b are in line with those from Tables 6a,b – both in terms of sign, magnitudes and 
significances. Therefore, there is no difference betwe n the two definitions of family. Also 
for these two last cases, after interacting the dependent variables of the model with the risk-
aversion indicator there are no significant estimates. 




In view of the growing relevance that international migration is acquiring in the 
economics literature as well as in the recent politica  agendas, with this paper, we studied the 
importance of social ties in determining migrant intentions to return to the country of origin. 
The main conclusion we can draw from our study tells us that the social network in the home 
country has more weight than the network at destinatio  in determining the migrant intention 
to return. In particular, the relation between the int ntion to return and the network at home 
– measured as the number of network members – is indirectly proportional – i.e. the bigger 
the network, the more the migrant tends to delay her return. We found that one more network 
member reduces the probability of return within five years by 0.9 percent. In particular, we 
observe the network effect to be stronger when the migrant considers the intention to return 
within the next ten years. Being the network at home the one that determines the intention to 
return, this pattern can be explained as the migrant home network is doomed to decrease over 
time and therefore the more time pass by the more importance the network will acquire. For 
all specifications, we find that the home network effect on the return intention at ten years is 
about double of the one at five years horizon. An increase of one member in the network at 
home decreases the probability to return within ten y ars by 19.5 pp. Regarding the social 
network at destination, there is no strong evidence that this affects the probability of return 
migration, perhaps partly due to the choice of the instrumental variable. 
One way to interpret the results obtained regarding the negative relationship between 
the network in the country of origin and the probability of return migration is that if the 
migrant has still many contacts at home, she can prolong her stay overseas without becoming 
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too worse off in terms of safety provided by the home network. With the time passing by, the 
home network can decrease in size; therefore the few r contacts become more crucial, as they 
represent a way to ensure a safe return back home. This result is similar in spirit to that 
obtained by Batista and Umblijs (2016) where they find that remittances are used as insurance 
to keep support of networks in the origin country. 
Studying the network effects over several time horizons, we find consistency in the 
estimates across different definition of networks. After finding negative and significant 
estimates for the size of the network at origin, trying to disentangle the puzzle around the 
network effect, we broke the general definition of network size into several components 
according to three categories: highly educated, working and non-family members 
individuals. We find that an increase in the home network size – defined as number of 
members who do not belong to the migrant family – reduces the probability of return within 
five and ten years by about 20 pp. and 40 pp., respectively. Although the associated 
regressions still seem to suffer from potential endogeneity problems, these results are in line 
with the main finding of our study. We further allow the network size to interact with an 
indicator of risk-aversion. The different estimations do not provide significant results, we can 
therefore conclude that risk do not bias the home network effect we presented. 
“Overall, this paper emphasized the importance of social ties at the country of origin 
in ensuring a safe and successful return, particularly those outside the family circle. 
Keeping in mind the potential effect of networks on return intentions, there are 
important economic implications, especially for origin countries, - that usually correspond to 
the less developed countries. Return migration can affect origin countries especially for what 
22 
concerns the quality of institutions as presented by Batista and Vicente (2011) or Batista, 
Seither and Vicente (2016). Rauch and Trindade 2002), show particular benefits for the home 
country in terms of international trade after return as effect of networking. In addition, 
Batista, McIndoe-Calder and Vicente (2014) show that t ere are clear gains in entrepreneurial 
capacity after migrants return. Therefore, goverments of migrant-sending countries may wish 
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Main Estimation Results 
 
- Instruments used in IV regression are the same for ve y specification: stock of migrants 
living in Ireland in 2000 for network at destination and self-reported average cost of calling 
home for network at origin. 
- Controls are the same for every regression as specified in Footnote 6. For the interaction term 
with the risk indicator we introduce also the two terms of the interaction separately. 
- Robust and clustered standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 2.a Network as size 
VARIABLES LPM IV 
 Intends to return 
Network size dest -0.0132* -0.0514 
(0.00717) (0.0474) 
Network size home -0.0274* -0.114 
(0.0161) (0.0760) 
Constant 0.854*** 1.154*** 
(0.190) (0.285) 
 Intends to return within 5 years 
Network size dest -0.00403 0.0127 
(0.00759) (0.0427) 
Network size home -0.00245 -0.0936* 
(0.0127) (0.0562) 
Constant 0.634*** 0.761*** 
(0.174) (0.241) 
 Intends to return within 10 years 
Network size dest -0.0126 -0.0145 
(0.00998) (0.0526) 
Network size home -0.0268 -0.194*** 
(0.0170) (0.0753) 
Constant 0.636*** 0.929*** 
(0.178) (0.304) 
   
Observations 752 681 
Controls YES YES 
FE YES YES 




Table 2.b Network as interaction term between the siz  and a risk indicator 
VARIABLES LPM IV  
 Intends to return 
Network size dest*Lottery 0.0369** -0.377 
(0.0146) (0.832) 




Network size dest -0.0420*** 0.280 
(0.0128) (0.648) 
Network size home 0.0247 0.801 
(0.0255) (1.204) 
Lottery 0.137 5.222 
(0.0864) (7.856) 
Constant 0.854*** -2.588 
(0.189) (5.395) 
 Intends to return within 5 years 
Network size dest*Lottery 0.0283* 0.0907 
(0.0143) (0.483) 
Network size home*Lottery -0.00249 -0.827 
(0.0291) (0.897) 
Network size dest -0.0261** -0.0763 
(0.0126) (0.375) 
Network size home 0.000735 0.617 
(0.0239) (0.651) 
Lottery -0.0968 1.894 
(0.0886) (4.333) 
Constant 0.728*** -0.586 
(0.181) (2.976) 
 Intends to return within 10 years 
Network size dest*Lottery 0.0204 -0.151 
(0.0181) (1.006) 
Network size home*Lottery -0.000794 -1.752 
(0.0299) (2.031) 
Network size dest -0.0285** 0.107 
(0.0137) (0.783) 
Network size home -0.0253 1.265 
(0.0268) (1.471) 
Lottery 0.00779 5.757 
(0.102) (9.595) 
Constant 0.706*** -3.207 
(0.192) (6.592) 
Observations 752 681 
Controls YES YES 
FE YES YES 
F-statistic on excluded instruments  0.242 
 
